THE KASHMIR CONSTITUTIONAL
DEADLOCK: INDIA’S ABOLITION OF ARTICLE 370 AND PAKISTAN’S UNRESOLVED AZAD JAMMU
& KASHMIR (AJK) DILEMMA
By Munir Ahmed Dar
Publisher & Chief Editor, The
Lyallpur Post (Canada)
Toronto, Ontario, Canada, July 23, 2026 (LPC): India’s unilateral revocation of Article 370 and Article
35A in August 2019 fundamentally altered the constitutional and political
landscape of the former State of Jammu & Kashmir. By dissolving the
region’s special status and dividing it into the Union Territories of Jammu
& Kashmir and Ladakh, India declared the territory fully absorbed into the
Indian Union, ending even the symbolic autonomy that had existed since 1947.
This moves controversial, forceful, and widely criticized demonstrated New
Delhi’s willingness to reshape the Kashmir dispute without consultation,
negotiation, or regard for international commitments. It was a decisive act,
regardless of its legality or legitimacy.
Pakistan, meanwhile, remains trapped in a constitutional
and diplomatic paralysis regarding Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK). For more
than seven decades, Islamabad has been unable to articulate a clear, coherent,
and sustainable policy for AJK’s future. The region continues to exist in a
constitutional grey zone neither a province of Pakistan, nor an independent
state, nor a fully autonomous entity. India’s decisive consolidation has only
magnified Pakistan’s indecision, leaving the people of AJK frustrated,
directionless, and increasingly vocal in their demand for clarity. The Jammu
& Kashmir Awami Action Committee’s recent protests are a stark reminder
that AJK’s population is no longer willing to remain suspended in political
limbo.
The roots of Pakistan’s dilemma lie in history. When
Pakistan assumed administrative control over parts of the former princely state
in 1947, the arrangement was explicitly provisional. The Karachi Agreement of
1949 placed defense, foreign affairs, and negotiations with India under
Pakistan’s control, while internal governance remained with the AJK government.
Over time, however, this temporary arrangement hardened. AJK adopted its own
interim constitution in 1974, established a Supreme Court and High Court,
formed a Legislative Assembly, and maintained a President and Prime Minister
distinct from Pakistan. Yet Pakistan retained decisive authority through the
Ministry of Kashmir Affairs. This duality autonomy on paper, dependency in
practice has persisted for decades without resolution.
Today, Pakistan faces three possible paths, each fraught
with complications. The first is to make AJK a full province of Pakistan.
Advocates argue that AJK residents deserve full constitutional rights,
representation in the National Assembly and Senate, and access to federal
resources. But this option directly contradicts Pakistan’s long‑standing
diplomatic position that Jammu & Kashmir is a disputed territory under UN
Security Council Resolutions. Provincial integration would weaken Pakistan’s
international argument and provoke demands for similar status from Gilgit‑Baltistan.
Many Kashmiris also fear that provincial status would erase their distinct
national identity.
The second option is to grant AJK representation in
Pakistan’s Parliament without making it a province. This hybrid model would
give AJK a voice in federal legislation while maintaining the disputed status.
Yet it raises serious constitutional contradictions: How can a territory not
formally part of Pakistan sits in Pakistan’s Parliament? Would representation
dilute Pakistan’s claim that the region’s final status must be determined
through a plebiscite? How would conflicts between AJK’s constitution and
Pakistan’s constitution be resolved? This option risks creating an even more
complex constitutional anomaly.
The third option an independent State of Jammu &
Kashmir remains the least politically feasible, despite its moral appeal to
some Kashmiris. India rejects independence outright, Pakistan fears losing
strategic depth, China’s interests in Gilgit‑Baltistan complicate the equation,
and the region’s internal diversity makes state‑building extraordinarily
difficult. Independence may be emotionally resonant, but geopolitically it is
improbable.
Meanwhile, the people of AJK increasingly feel abandoned
by both Islamabad and the international community. Their frustrations stem from
lack of representation in Pakistan’s Parliament, ambiguous constitutional
status, economic stagnation, and the absence of a clear roadmap for integration
or independence. The Awami Action Committee’s protests reflect a population
that is no longer willing to accept symbolic autonomy without substantive
rights. Their message is unmistakable: AJK cannot remain in constitutional
limbo forever.
Pakistan’s inability to articulate a coherent policy for
AJK stems from diplomatic caution tied to UN resolutions, constitutional
ambiguity, internal political divisions, security‑centric decision‑making, fear
of international backlash, and lack of national consensus. The result is a
policy that is reactive rather than strategic, symbolic rather than structural.
Pakistan cannot indefinitely maintain a structure that is neither fully
autonomous nor fully integrated. A sustainable solution requires national dialogue
involving AJK leadership, Gilgit‑Baltistan, Parliament, and civil society; a
constitutional roadmap aligned with international commitments; representation
mechanisms giving AJK a voice in Pakistan’s federal system; transparent
engagement with AJK’s population; and a diplomatic strategy that preserves
Pakistan’s position while addressing ground realities.
India’s abolition of Article 370 has reshaped the Kashmir
dispute, but Pakistan’s response remains mired in confusion. AJK’s people are
left without clarity, without representation, and without a defined future.
Their frustration is real, their protests justified, and their demands
legitimate. The question now is not whether Pakistan can act but whether it
will. Azad Jammu & Kashmir cannot remain suspended between autonomy and
annexation, between disputed status and constitutional silence. The time for
clarity has arrived.